

MYTHOS, LOGOS AND DISPOSITION (*Stimmung*)

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If we are to explicate the complex relationship between $\epsilon\tilde{u}\tilde{a}\tilde{i}\tilde{o}$ and $\iota\tilde{y}\tilde{e}\tilde{i}\tilde{o}$, we should first reveal the complex nature of $\epsilon\tilde{u}\tilde{a}\tilde{i}\tilde{o}$ as such. In doing so, we shall rely on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, paying particular attention to his *Being and Time*. However, before we delve into this issue, we should, following Heidegger in *Being and Time*, first of all say that the notion of $\epsilon\tilde{u}\tilde{a}\tilde{i}\tilde{o}$ and its three-sided nature is grounded in the notion of being-in-the-world (Ger. in-der-Welt-sein). Being-in-the-world, we learn, is the basic existiale (Ger. Existential) of *Dasein*. *Dasein* encounters itself primarily as a being within the world.

One cannot overestimate and overvalue the importance of introducing this notion into philosophy. Unlike other philosophers from the past, distant and recent, Heidegger makes us feel at home with all our pre-theoretical attitudes, bearings and activities, which in the Cartesian – or rather the Platonic tradition proved the primary obstacle on the way to truth and true knowledge. Reconsidering Heidegger's contribution, we must bear in mind that it differs in crucial respects from that of René Descartes. We can pinpoint the major difference between these two of the greatest philosophers of the modern age by concentrating on the first meditation of Descartes' *Meditations* and the second paragraph of *Being and Time*: entering the Cartesian world, we are first asked to do away with the sphere of our everydayness. If we want to walk the path of true knowledge, we have to forget everything which makes the world and life homely and familiar: the method here undertaken is that of radical doubt, as is well known. The feeling of belonging to a family and country, love for a chosen one, dreams, memories of things long past, stories told by our grandparents, premonitions, anticipations, sentiments, fears and anxieties, the melody of one's mother tongue, the pleasures and wonders of sensual life – we could go on and on – it all has to be set aside as something erroneous, leading astray from the true path to knowledge. Doubt also undermines the basic belief in our senses: what we at first see as a burning candle, after a certain period of time turns into liquid wax, therefore the perception of a candle is something that just cannot be trusted.¹

How altogether differently speaks to us the beginning of Heidegger's major work: The human being is a being which encounters itself and the world in all dimensions and aspects as a being-in-the world. No need for the elimination of all sense data, reminiscences and imagina-

tion. All that was bracketed out in Descartes now serves as the positive ground for developing either scientific or philosophical knowledge.

Descartes' *cogito sum* is the subject whose nature – after the obliteration of all experience – can be thought in categories. In Heidegger, *Dasein* is discussed in terms of existentialia, such as feeling, understanding and language (Ger. Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Sprache). What are then the various layers of *Sprache*, considered on the ground of *in-der-Welt-sein*? The three layers of $\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$ are the following:

Layer 1: Impersonal talk, (Ger. Gerede): In paragraph 33, *Gerede*, Heidegger stresses that *Gerede* here isn't used in the negative sense but rather *POSITIVELY* as a phenomenon which constitutes the manner of being of understanding of everyday *Dasein*. This is an explication of the difference between Descartes and Heidegger. By stressing the positive character, Heidegger obviously responds to Descartes' demand for the exclusion of the everydayness of *Gerede* and everyday understanding of being-in-the world.

Layer 2: Logic: that we can describe and attribute qualities to things, *Dasein* and things of the world first have to be given in the openness of the world as the disclosedness, in which *Dasein* and the world are given and revealed, only then to be able to correspond and agree. Agreement of propositions and things is *enabled by* and *given in* the openness, disclosure of the worldhood of the world. Truth as *adequatio intellectus ad rem* is therefore not given by the negation of everyday experience, as in Descartes, but rather *by the very givenness* of everyday being-in-the-world. To put it differently, traditional truth rests upon and grows from common experience, opinions (Gr. *doksa*), sensations, perceptions, premonitions, remembrances ... TRUTH AS ADEQUATIO of reason and things IS GROUNDED IN TRUTH AS UNCONCEALMENT, *Unverborgenheit*, *aletheia*.

Traditional thought, best formulated in Plato and Descartes, grounds and builds its project on the duality of $\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$ as *Gerede* and $\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$ as *Logik*. The erroneous world of perception, sensation and emotion is neglected, rejected in order to begin the building up of a rational system, set apart from the world of becoming. Plato in *Phaidon* explicitly states that senses distract the soul from reaching the region of truth. Soul is deemed immortal, truth belongs to a sphere devoid of all change and becoming, ideas are not subject to changes. The dualism therefore rests on the following dualities: truth/lie, truthfulness/deception, beauty/ugliness, holy/profane, and good/evil. According to Nietzsche, the last duality forms the basis of all other dualities. What is subject to change, difference, is not good for us humans and is therefore evil, staying outside the realm of eternal truth; that which transcends all change and is within the realm of eternal identity, is good and beautiful and sacred and untruthful. This is why Nietzsche calls his critique of philosophy and religion a critique of morality.

Descartes' candle from the first meditation could well serve as a metaphor for the whole region of temporal phenomena: objects of sensual perception, sensations, images of imagination, they are all subject to change and therefore deception or *genius malignus*. What lies above this sphere is not Plato's immortal soul, taking part in transcendent ideas, but rather a pure subject as ego cogito, or cogito sum. As Descartes himself puts it, it is or should be the Archimedean point which transcends all change. This is nowadays generally

understood as the shift to modern age or anthropocentrism, where the cogito is the only subject within the universe of representable objects.

It is within this framework of thought, which might provisionally be called transcendentalism, that Husserl's project takes place. His *Cartesian Meditations* begin the same project, only in a more radical way. Husserl says that his meditations are a further development of Descartes' and a stricter method of doubt. And again the first demand is the dismissal of the being of the world, if we are to find absolute certainty as the ground for philosophy as pure science—what he strives for is the apodictic evidence of the absolute ego.

However, this Husserl of *Cartesian Meditations* differs significantly from Husserl of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. What exactly happens in this text? If Husserl in *Cartesian Meditations* — in tune with the Platonic and Cartesian tradition — brackets out the being of the world and the being of *Dasein* as being within the world, in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, the being of the world, which is given in experience and handed down by tradition is deemed a *positive* ground for further investigation. The method he introduces is that of the *Rückfrage*, a retroactive question — need I say that it's the hermeneutic method of understanding? That which is known, either in living experience or by way of tradition, is the first and necessary premise for engaging the research of the unknown — within that which is known. This could be called a step away from the Cartesian method of doubt — the birth of the phenomenological method. Here, Husserl lays stress on the non-evident and non-reflected obviousness handed down by tradition. This is in fact the manner in which tradition is handed down — there is no genuine (*eigentlich*) handing down of a tradition — it is accepted by a passive reception of beliefs and truths. And these passively received truths of the world are the sediment for a deeper understanding of ourselves and the world. Despite this stepping away, Husserl remains within the framework of Platonism exactly by his acceptance of the absolute ego as *the unquestioned ground* of apodictic evidence.

But it is this very epistemological turn that is further investigated by Husserl's student Martin Heidegger. And thus we come to the third dimension of *ἔννοιον*, *Sprache*, which retrospectively changes the very nature and attitude towards both *Gerede* as well as *Logik*.

3. *ἔννοιον* as *Sprache*: Heidegger's necessity of posing the question of being starts from where Husserl stopped: if Husserl stopped at the unquestionable, self-evident being of consciousness, Heidegger dug deeper only to discover that the being of *Dasein* isn't eternal, ever-present, but rather finite and mortally vulnerable. In the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger starts from the well-known and established "facts" about being, handed down by tradition: "Being is the most general concept", "Being cannot be defined" and "Being is a self-evident concept not wanting further investigation".² However for Heidegger, the question of being becomes *the Rückfrage* of his philosophical endeavor.

The focus of our present attention is the being of *Dasein* as being-within-the world and the complex existentials *ἔννοιον*. Traditional thought rests upon the truth as *adequatio*, the agreement of consciousness and being. Not so in Heidegger: we most assuredly gain a closer understanding of Heidegger's

thought if we do not set aside his notion of *áĕĤĕĕĕá*, *Unverborgenheit*, unconcealment. If we commence from the ground of *adequatio*, what happens is that we exclude in advance the worldhood of the world in its disclosure. In-der-Welt-sein and its existentialia can only be given thought to on the ground of the truth as *áĕĤĕĕĕá*.

What is *ĕĕĕĕ* from the perspective of *áĕĤĕĕĕá*? What is *Sprache*? It is the manner of being of *Dasein*, which understands itself and the world through language. And, which is even more important, *Dasein* understands itself and the world *also through its feelings* (Ger. Affekten, Leidenschaften und Stimmungen); despite the fact that everyday understanding is in the manner of inquisitiveness (Ger. Neugier). *ĕĕĕĕ* as *Sprache* is a further development of *Gerede and Logik* precisely as its abysmal foreground. The knowledge of the world doesn't start with the requirement of agreement, *adequatio* of mind and being, but from the *openness* of both mind and the world. *Sprache* is also the language employed in *Being and Time*, serving to reveal and articulate the sphere which was previously hidden and neglected. This sphere is theoretical within the framework of traditionally understood theory as opposed to the erroneous field of being in the world.

The sphere of *Stimmungen* is therefore already certain knowledge of the self and the world. When we say "Es stimmt," we are "pre-theoretically" in tune with a certain truth – translation into English would be "This holds true". "This holds true", *es stimmt*, meaning we are already in hold of a certain truth of the world and the self. Both *ĕĕĕĕ* and *ĕĕĕĕ* are names applied in the investigation of the previously neglected sphere of being-in-the-world, which, however – as Heidegger says – is the groundless ground of higher knowledge. There is no ground as absolute as the *cogito sum* or absolute ego.

To put it in a nutshell, Heidegger reveals the sphere of *ĕĕĕĕ* which was neglected exactly in that it was deemed self-evident, general, beyond any definition. And *ĕĕĕĕ* – as the medial sphere making possible both *Gerede* and *Logik* – is the naming which brings together man and the world in their openness and encountering.

We are now moving towards the relationship between *ĕĕĕĕ* and *ĕĕĕĕ*. Traditionally, that is in the Platonic tradition, *ĕĕĕĕ* was pushed towards the sphere of a mere *Gerede*, or, at its best, the embellishment or ornament (Ger. Dekoration) of logic as dialectics. However, it was never fully overcome. And how could it be? What would Plato do without his Metaphor of the Cave?

At the beginning of *Being and Time*, Heidegger cites a sentence taken from Plato's *Sophist*: "ĕĕĕĕ ĕĕĕĕ ĕĕĕĕ, do not tell stories".³ This may well seem a direct critique of *ĕĕĕĕ* within the sphere of philosophy, as if it had no place in it at all. However, we shouldn't take this sentence literally, *i.e.* as a philosophical obviousness, but rather as an indirect critique of metaphysics, that is to say onto-theology. We shouldn't explain or determine beings in their origin by reducing them to yet another being or essent. This is acceptable when considered within the frame of the critique of onto-theology. But what can we say about *ĕĕĕĕ* itself? Is it really solely a matter of onto-theology? Obviously

not. How are we otherwise to understand Plato's metaphor of the Sun depicting the idea of the Good, $\zeta \delta\iota\omega \acute{\alpha}\alpha\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\iota\omega \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}$, which is as such beyond all entities and essences, beyond the being of beings? As well as Heidegger's *Geviert*, which gives the being of beings and beings as such?

$\text{M}\acute{\Upsilon}\epsilon\iota\delta$ lies in the core of $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\delta$. It is not just the accompanying phenomenon of $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\delta$, or a language leading us astray from the path to true knowledge. Rather, it is to be understood as the final frontier and inner limit of $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\delta$, beginning where $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\delta$ fails, further articulating the truth revealed through $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\delta$. At the end of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates' concluding thought was: "And thus Glaucon, the tale [$\text{I}\acute{\Upsilon}\epsilon\iota\delta$] was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe in it, and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our souls unspotted from the world."⁴

For Plato, $\text{I}\acute{\Upsilon}\epsilon\iota\delta$ is the soul's savior.

On the Way to Interpretation. Friedrich Nietzsche

In view of the three levels of $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\Upsilon}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}\delta$, we shall discuss Nietzsche's philosophy in these three aspects.

1. *Gerede, Neugier, Rumor and Inquisitiveness*: we needn't pay particular attention to the common, everyday understanding of Nietzsche's thought according to which the obviousness and self-evidence of the handing down of tradition would have us believe as follows: in everyday understanding, we superficially address Nietzsche's philosophy without stopping even for a second to pay regard to the meanings and historical truth he articulates of us moderns. Statements or judgments such as: "There is no truth, everything is allowed", Nietzsche as the anticipator as well as instigator of German national socialism; proof: every German soldier of WW1 carried in his satchel beside medications *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, and Hitler was given Nietzsche's walking stick. His superman is an image of the Arian SS soldier; it was his heretic thought that drove him mad.

The truth expressed in *Gerede* articulates a certain *Stimmung* as an inclination to or against Nietzsche's thought. This is how tradition is handed down: we shouldn't judge these *a priori*s and superficial judgments as a mere obstacle on the way to a real Nietzsche interpretation. There is no Nietzsche thought in itself. The *Befindlichkeit* which permeates words, opinions, and judgments on Nietzsche is the primary disclosure of Nietzsche to us through tradition. As the sedimentation of more or less passively received opinions, beliefs, and *sentiments and resentments* as the basic disposition, this should rather serve as a *positive* ground for a further and deeper investigation of his thought.

2. Logic: the second step is getting to grips with Nietzsche tackling the problem of logic: there are numerous fragments, paragraphs scattered all over his work, which concentrate on the issues of causal connection, the relationship of the subject and the predicate, the thing in itself and thing for us, being and beings.

If we are even slightly acquainted with Plato's philosophy, we cannot say that Nietzsche's articulation of the problem of the thing in itself and the participation and agreement of ideas and things is actually one that is original

to him. For already in the dialogue *Parmenid*, Plato executed a severe critique of his own theory of ideas, found in *Phaidon*. Nietzsche's critique of truth as *adequatio* is already tackled by Plato himself. The same can be said about his thought of the subject of activity, a critique of substance in his famous passage on the "lightning strikes", "der Blitz leuchtet" (13th paragraph in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*); despite its stylistic perfection, it cannot be deemed his own. It was again already Plato who undermined the causal connection between substance and its effectuating. What happens is that the phenomenon "strikes" is turned into effect with cause in the thing that strikes. The causal connection is turned upside down: adding a cause (subject, substance) to the striking is an erroneous procedure, which is effectuated by the grammar of language. Whenever we introduce a verb, we have already co-introduced a noun as the initiator of the activity as expressed in the verb. When we say "think", the language itself already attributes a subject: it is *I* who thinks, thus splitting the phenomenon of thinking into the subject as the cause of the predicate as the effect of "thinking".

The traditional division essence/appearance is already tackled by Kant: all we can know and realize are things for us, *die Sachen selbst*, ὁ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν, while ὁ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν remain unknown. Nietzsche actually goes further in saying that if there is a collapse of the agreement between essences and appearances, things can no longer be thought through this duality, that is to say, they cannot be thought in Kant's sense as things-for-us.

This, however, already widely opens the door to Heidegger's concept of ὄν ὡς ἀλήθεια, discussed in *Being and Time*, as embedded in truth as ἀλήθεια. Both *Gerede* and *Logik* cannot come close to Nietzsche's original contribution making him an original thinker of modernity. We come closer to his genuine thought through his ἰδέϊν, namely *der Gedanke der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen*, the eternal recurrence of the same. Can we talk of ἰδέϊν as a thought? Indeed we can; under the entry ἰδέϊν, the Greek-Slovene dictionary brings forward the meanings to tell, and *think*. Even if we didn't know this, could we say that Hesiod's *Theogony* or Parmenides' poem *Ἔπος ἀφ' αἰῶνος* ("On Nature") are just myths lacking in any thought? Obviously not.

What is then *die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*? In *Zarathustra*, which is an extraordinary amalgam of his εὐαγγέλιον and ἰδέϊν, we are given the riddle of all riddles.

Vom Gesicht und Rätsel

„Düster ging ich jüngst durch leichenfarbne Dämmerung, – düster und hart, mit gepreßten Lippen. Nicht nur eine Sonne war mir untergegangen,“ says Zarathustra. But he won't give in to this spirit of revenge, spirit of heaviness; he will climb the hill despite the dwarf sitting on his shoulder, nagging him: „O Zarathustra“, raunte er höhnisch Silb' um Silbe, „du Stein der Weisheit! Du warfst dich hoch, aber jeder geworfene Stein muß – fallen! O Zarathustra, du Stein der Weisheit, du Schleuderstein, du Stern-Zertrümmerer! Dich selber warfst du so hoch, – aber jeder geworfene Stein – muß fallen! And it is at this moment that Zarathustra introduces the riddle of all riddles. There are two gates facing each other: one of them leads into the future, the other into the past. And what if both

paths are infinite? Is then the future still opposed to the past, do they contradict each other, if all the future has already happened? This is the moment of the shortest shadow, and we can only marvel at his image of the eternal recurrence of the same, which makes the dwarf as the spirit of heaviness disappear:

Und wenn alles schon dagewesen ist: was hältst du Zwerg von diesem Augenblick? Muß auch dieser Torweg nicht schon – dagewesen sein? Und sind nicht solchermaßen fest alle Dinge verknotet, daß dieser Augenblick alle kommenden Dinge nach sich zieht? Also – sich selber noch? Denn, was laufen kann von allen Dingen: auch in dieser langen Gasse hinaus – muß es einmal noch laufen! –

Und diese langsame Spinne, die im Mondscheine kriecht, und dieser Mondschein selber, und ich und du im Torwege, zusammen flüsternd, von ewigen Dingen flüsternd – müssen wir nicht alle schon dagewesen sein? – und wiederkommen und in jener anderen Gasse laufen, hinaus, vor uns, in dieser langen schaurigen Gasse – müssen wir nicht ewig wiederkommen?–“

Also redete ich, und immer leiser: denn ich fürchtete mich vor meinen eignen Gedanken und Hintergedanken. Da, plötzlich, hörte ich einen Hund nahe heulen. Hörte ich jemals einen Hund so heulen? Mein Gedanke lief zurück. Ja! Als ich Kind war, in fernster Kindheit:

– da hörte ich einen Hund so heulen. Und sah ihn auch, gesträubt, den Kopf nach oben, zitternd, in stillster Mitternacht, wo auch Hunde an Gespenster glauben: – also daß es mich erbarmte. Eben nämlich ging der volle Mond, totschweigsam, über das Haus, eben stand er still, eine runde Glut, – still auf flachem Dache, gleich als auf fremdem Eigentume: –

Darob entsetzte sich damals der Hund: denn Hunde glauben an Diebe und Gespenster. Und als ich wieder so heulen hörte, da erbarmte es mich abermals.“

We miss the message of this chapter, if we look at it with the eyes of traditional *ëüãäò* as *Gerede* and *Logik*. This thought disturbs everyday understanding in its self-complacency and logic in its axiomatic peace. Both fail to get to grips with what Nietzsche wants to say – or better still – what the metaphor itself has to say both to him and us.

What here comes into play is *ëüãäò* as *Sprache* and mythos as a-logical thought. We are here employing Heidegger's *Dasein* in its being-in-the-world, its main existentialia being *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen* and *Sprache*. How does Zarathustra understand himself through the metaphor, and what disposition is revealed to us through his words? The riddle is obviously all about the truth of *Dasein*'s disposition and the world revealed in this disposition. What does the story invoke? The disposition of modern man: "Gloomily walked I lately in corpse colored twilight gloomily and sternly, with compressed lips. Not only one sun has set for me." Everything recurs, everything has already happened, there is nothing new looming on the horizon. The existentials of *Befindlichkeit* is that of profound boredom and weariness and gloom – and it is from this fundamental ill-humor, *Stimmung als Verstimmung* that a certain truth about man and the world is either covertly or overtly articulated. A brief mentioning of Schopenhauer's will to life and his pessimism will be enough to suggest what is meant by this resentment. Neither *Gerede* nor *Logik* with its systematic comfort can either solve this riddle or rescue us from its dismal implications.

Perhaps the best thing they can do – and they manage it pretty well – is to hide it from us. The event of the lightning striking, transforming the last, weary man into the man of a new future has to take place and be articulated not in categories, but through existentialia.

We have to ask ourselves, what is it that makes the dwarf, the spirit of heaviness and revenge, *den Zwerg als den Geist der Schwere und Rache* disappear?

For just then went the full moon, silent as death, over the house; just then did it stand still, a glowing globe – at rest on the flat roof, as if on someone's property: thereby had the dog been terrified: for dogs believe in thieves and ghosts. [...] Where was now the dwarf? And the gateway? And the spider? And all the whispering? Had I dreamt? Had I awakened? Amid rugged rocks did I suddenly stand alone, dreary in the dreariest moonlight.

What is articulated in these mythical thoughts, if not the *disposition of anxiety*, die *Angst*. It is the anxiety that is unbearable for the spirit of heaviness always seeking truth and beauty beyond being-in-the-world, *jenseits von in-der-Welt-sein*, its dispositions and sentiments.

Can we support this argument? And first of all, how can we tell that this transformation, the event of being, does not take place in the realm of the will as the will to power?

In *Zaratustra*, in Paragraph *Redemption*, we read the following: “This yes, this alone is revenge itself: the Will's ANTIPATHY to time, and its “It was”. / (Von der Erlösung) Dies, ja dies allein ist Rache selber: des Willens *Widerwille* gegen die Zeit und ihr „Es war“.

What is the antipathy (ill-humor) of the will? Was ist den die *Widerwille* (Unmut) der Wille? Is it the will? Or is it something else? According to Nietzsche's logic, can there be a will that manifests itself as ill-humor? Is there a lightning behind the striking? Accordingly, is there a will manifesting itself as unwillingness? Gibt es eine Wille die erscheint als *Widerwille*? Gibt es ein Blitz der leuchtet? No. What is then the ill-humor, unwillingness, antipathy, disgust, *Verdrossenheit*, *Unmut*, *Widerwille*? Is it not the disposition, *Stimmung* als *Verstimmung*? Doesn't it all happen not in the sphere of the will, but in the sphere of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world, in *Befindlichkeit*? It is exactly the *Befindlichkeit* of both boredom and disgust that both Zaratustra and the dwarf express – the dwarf is namely being carried by Zaratustra himself. And by delivering the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same, *the resentment makes way to anxiety* – the dwarf, the spirit of revenge and heaviness disappears in anxiety. And what is the laughter of the shepherd who sits and bites off the head of the snake, representing this very thought? Where does the laughter come from? Exactly from the twilight of *Befindlichkeit*, anxiety and “freedom and celestial serenity” (Before the Sunrise) (*Angst* und “diese Freiheit und Himmels-Heiterkeit” – Vor Sonnen-Aufgang). They go together as the two sides of the paper-sheet.

This is a story of the awakening of *Befindlichkeit*, of disposition, which from *Verstimmung* turns into gute Laune; and it is precisely this mythical thought which is the original and genuine Nietzsche.

In the last part, we shall try to articulate the dimension of *Befindlichkeit*, or better *Stimmung*, in terms which befit its ontological status.

Disposition as such is not at our disposal. It is not an attribute of the substance called the subject. It is not subjected to the subject. We can neither will it nor willingly do away with it. Disposition rather dis-poses of *Dasein* in its attunement with the being of the world. When we are well-disposed, *gestimmt*, we get ourselves together, *wir kommenn zusammen, versammeln uns*, being able to perceive, sense, feel, think with swiftness and ease. This “getting yourself together” in disposition reveals the direct relationship of *Stimmung* with $\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$ as the gathering of things in their disclosure (in English we find a direct correspondence between $\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$ and cognition: to gather something).

The English language brings us closer to another dimension of *Stimmung* and another ancient Greek word, which is akin to $\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$. When in doing something we either lose or gain strength, our composure, *die Sammlung* ($\epsilon\ddot{u}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$!) grows or fades. The “logical” nature of *Stimmung* reveals itself in growth and fading. We have shown the close affinity between $\epsilon\ddot{i}\ddot{a}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}$ and $\omicron\ddot{o}\ddot{o}\ddot{e}\ddot{o}$. $\omicron\ddot{o}\ddot{a}\ddot{e}\ddot{i}$ means to grow, become. For like $\omicron\ddot{o}\ddot{o}\ddot{e}\ddot{o}$, *Stimmung* (and the world!) both grows and fades, is unconcealed and concealed, *unverborgen und verborgen*. And since, as Heraklit puts it, nature likes to hide itself, we have brought into discussion the genuinely Greek meaning of truth as $\acute{\alpha}\ddot{\zeta}\ddot{c}\ddot{e}\ddot{a}\ddot{e}\acute{\alpha}$, unconcealment, *Unverborgenheit*. When our composure (*Sammlung*) fades, when we are not composed or well-disposed, the disclosedness of the world and ourselves hides itself in the hiddenness. *Wenn wir gestimmt sind, die Erschlossenheit der Welt und uns selber verbirgt sich in sich-bergen*. We are, as we usually say, absent, even though we are still here. *Wir sind abwesend, obwohl anwesend*.

The well-disposed person is outside himself by the things of the world, *ein gestimmter Mann ist ausser sich bei den Dingen der Welt*. *Dasein* and the world bring each other into the richness of life. We have thus introduced the original meaning of ancient Greek $\acute{\alpha}\ddot{\zeta}\ddot{o}\ddot{o}\ddot{a}\ddot{o}\ddot{e}\ddot{o}$ (the verb $\acute{\alpha}\ddot{i}\ddot{o}\ddot{e}\ddot{o}\ddot{o}\ddot{a}\ddot{u}\ddot{e}$ means to stand outside oneself, to be outside oneself) – not just man, but also the world). The rational ideal, which for more than two thousand years nourished distrust to sensuality, emotions and *Stimmung*, has pushed the ecstasy to the insignificant margin of human experience. While the dispositional ecstasy *discloses man and the world in an extraordinary mutual disclosure and encountering*. *Die Ekstase der Stimmung erschliesst den Mensch und die Welt in eine aussergewöhnliche Erschlossenheit und Sich-Treffen*. “In order to protect it from being „rationally“ reproached as irrationality, we should look for the names which correspond to their distinctive nature: and these names are *serenity and anxiety, Heiterkeit und Angst*. The “dis” in the disclosure of man in dis-position brings before us anxiety, but which – as in Nietzsche’s *Zaratustra* – turns into serenity, which brings out both man and the world in a melodious disclosure.

Although Nietzsche’s story of *Stimmung* is a covert one, and Heidegger’s *Befindlichkeit* is overtly discussed in *Being and Time* and elsewhere, the story of disposition is not yet finished, but still awaits us modern men to perfect our skills of narrating it.

Sils-Maria

Hier saß ich, wartend, wartend, – doch auf nichts,
Jenseits von Gut und Böse, bald des Lichts
Genießend, bald des Schattens, ganz nur Spiel,
Ganz See, ganz Mittag, ganz Zeit ohne Ziel.
Da, plötzlich, Freundin! wurde eins zu zwei –
– Und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei ...

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Notes

- ¹ For this issue, com. Descartes, *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, I. Meditation.
- ² M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Introduction.
- ³ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Introduction.
- ⁴ *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 844.