

мое количество частей, начинать от простейших и легко понимаемых вещей и т. д.), они являлись не правилами философского метода, а указаниями дидактики. В то же время в учебных заведениях Великого княжества Литовского все еще существовали теории средневековой логики, являющиеся зачатками теорий современной логики: логики высказываний, предикатов и классов, теории логического следования, модальной логики, логической семантики и семиотики. Весьма обстоятельно была сформулирована проблема разрешимости, приблизились к пониманию метаязыка и метаязыковых построений. Обсуждались проблемы, имеющие реальное значение: универсума и определения индивида в нем, абстракции и идеализации, сущности и существования, возможных миров и т. д. Школьная философия информировала и о новейших естественнонаучных достижениях, и о новых идеях в философии. Передовые профессора в лекциях по физике знакомили студентов с новейшими достижениями естествознания — с воззрениями и теориями Коперника, Галилея, Браге, Кеплера, Ричиолли, Шейнера, Кирхера, Ронделе, Везалия, Гарвея, Чезальнина, Фракастора, Кардана и др. В лоне натурфилософии зарождались зачатки будущих естественных наук.

Усилиями интеллигенции и при прямой поддержке властей в государстве было создано то, чего раньше не существовало, — система философского образования и условия для философского творчества. Общество того времени обогатилось в сфере идей и мысли как таковой. Поэтому обращение к древней философской традиции имеет для нас значение, которое трудно переоценить.

Примечания

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- ³ *Lietuvos filosofinės minties istorijos šaltiniai*. I tomas. Feodalizmo laikotarpis. Vilnius, 1980.
- ⁴ Plečkaitis R. *Feodalizmo laikotarpio filosofija Lietuvoje. Filosofija Lietuvos mokyklose XVI–XVIII amžiais*. Vilnius, 1975.
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The *weak thought* (*il pensiero debole*) is an expression which was first used at the beginning of 90's by a contemporary Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo in one of his articles. However, very soon this expression (as claims Vattimo himself in *To Believe in Believing* (1996) became the name not only for the collection of articles and, later, for the periodical publication issue but also the title of all Italian postmodernism represented by Vattimo, Amoroso, Carchia, Comolli, Costa, Crespi, Dal Lago, Eco, Ferraris, Marconi etc. Even more, today it is the name of a philosophical position and thought. Nowadays the *weak thought* became a philosophical paradigm. The goal of my article is not to clarify whether the *weak thought* is a philosophical movement or a specific way of contemporary thought, but to discuss the philosophical position of the *weak thought* represented by Vattimo himself.

What is the *weak thought*? What kind of the disposition of thought is supposed in the adjective *weak* which from the first sight could hardly go as an attribute to the noun *thought*. But namely this word combination, as it was mentioned, is how Vattimo called his philosophical position. The exposition of the program of his position was first presented in *The End of Modernity* (1985), the book which consists of separate articles during the last years published in the periodical press. Later this position was re-discussed and re-specified searching to reveal the new and unexpected aspects as well as to indicate and to solve separate problems from the position of the *weak thought*.

The anti-metaphysical view which according to Nietzsche was conditioned by the horizon of Heidegger's thought (and is easily distinguishable as a formal feature of this thought) in comparison with other postmodern thinkers (Rorty, Derrida) seems rather to be a similarity than an originality. The essence of the *weak thought*, although, is to be searched namely by responding to the question what these formal features hide.

Why Nietzsche and Heidegger?

In his preface to *The End of Modernity* Vattimo says that this book was dedicated to elucidate the relationship between the outcome of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's thoughts and the discourse on the end of Modernity and Postmodernism. Only the discussion about the post-modern relationship with Nietzsche's theme of eternal recurrence and Heidegger's position of the overcoming of metaphysics could reveal the peculiarities of post-modern thought. Both here mentioned

philosophical insights are important as they can not be reduced to the simple *Kulturkritik* which went through the philosophical thought until the 20th century. Thus, Vattimo considers both Heidegger's critique of humanism and Nietzsche's announcement of accomplished nihilism as «'positive' moments for a philosophical reconstruction, and not merely as symptoms and declarations of decadence»¹. It can be clearly seen in the preface to the mentioned book that a *post-modern* relationship that Vattimo keeps with Nietzsche and Heidegger is the same attitude that these thinkers established in regard to the heritage of European thought. Despite all the differences Vattimo indicates in their thought the *common* point of view which opens the perspective in which the essential feature of European thought becomes clear: European thought is merged with an idea of history. Namely Hegel's historicism makes philosophy to evaluate the former heritage with a demand of a critical overcoming (*Aufhebung*). The Enlightenment's idea of progress now is directed against philosophy itself. According to Vattimo, «from the point of view of Nietzsche and Heidegger [...] modernity is, in fact, dominated by the idea that the history of thought is a progressive 'enlightenment' which develops through an ever more complete appropriation and re-appropriation of its own 'foundations'. These are often also understood as 'origins', so that the theoretical and practical revolutions of Western history are presented and legitimated for the most part as 'recoveries', rebirths, or returns (recurrences). The idea of 'overcoming', which is so important in all modern philosophy, understands the course of thought as being progressive development in which the new is identified with value through the mediation of the recovery and appropriation of the foundation-origin»². In this case Nietzsche's and Heidegger's positions are united by a refusal of the critical overcoming of the former philosophical heritage. The other aspect of this attitude is «anti-foundationalism». Vattimo says: «However, precisely the notion of foundation, and of thought both as foundation and means of access to a foundation, is radically interrogated by Nietzsche and Heidegger»³. The refusal of Hegel's ideas of historicism and foundationalism is the factor that, according to Vattimo, can define the post-modern point of view. This attitude is complicated enough as, on the one hand, it is necessary to take up a critical distance from Western thought insofar as it is foundational; on the other hand, there is no possibility to criticize Western thought in the name of another, «truer foundation». And this is a critical situation in which Vattimo finds both Nietzsche, Heidegger and himself. However, are Nietzsche's and Heidegger's anti-historicism and anti-foundationalism *the same*? Or maybe that identity of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's positions is the identity seen by the eyes of Vattimo? The identity that defines the position represented by Vattimo himself, i. e. the post-modern position of the *weak thought*?

Vattimo appeals constantly to Nietzsche *and* Heidegger, and not only describing his starting point but also formulating the philosophical problems that emerge in the horizon of his thought. Frequently, when indicating the sources of his thought, he will refer to Nietzsche, Heidegger *and* Christianity. The latter *and* can sound paradoxically and even in a shocking way. But namely it, the second mentioned *and*, enables us to understand the first one,

that is to find the point from which the identity of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's thought is revealed.

In his *To Believe in Believing* Vattimo seeks to justify himself for setting the background on this strange combination: Nietzsche, Heidegger *and* Christianity. According to his words, he prefers these two thinkers «and (or even especially) because» their propositions seem to accord harmonically with «religious, and specifically Christian, substratum which remained alive» also in Vattimo himself. «I return to think about Christianity, because I constructed a philosophy inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger and in its light I interpreted my experience in the actual world; most probably I constructed this philosophy with a preference of these authors because I started to move from this Christian heritage, which, it seems, I discover now, but which, in fact, I have never really abandoned»⁴. This *circulus vitiosus* is how Vattimo describes his philosophical identity and, to his mind, is how the relation between our world of the late Modernity and the Christian heritage could be described as well.

But in which way should we see the Christianity to be able to reveal from its perspective the identity of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's positions? On the other hand, how should we see Nietzsche and Heidegger that the identity of their positions could become the perspective of the interpretation of Christianity? Vattimo does not seek to run away from this circle. This circle in a certain way defines the horizon of his philosophy...

Thought as the history of Being (the Event)

The melting of the idea of history inevitably makes us put a question about the sense of *where* of our thought, that is whether it is possible to indicate the locality of our thought beyond the idea of history. But the post-modern thought of our days is namely the one that considers the definition of its own place in *history* to be very important. Thus, we should ask a natural question: which concept of history the *weak thought* is based on after having rejected the idea of history? In the history of thought of the latter two ages the tendency to deny the possibility to base the thought on the stable structures of Being as on the immutably true background is easily noticed. According to Vattimo, this melting of the stability of Being was only partially carried out in the main philosophical systems of the 19th century. Only Nietzsche and Heidegger radicalized this tendency, because they «conceive of Being as an *event*, for both of them it is vitally important, in order to be able to speak of Being, to understand at 'what point' we are, and at 'what point' Being itself is»⁵. Thus, ontology for Vattimo is «nothing other than the interpretation of our condition or situation, since Being is nothing apart from its 'event', which occurs when it historicizes itself and when we historicize ourselves»⁶. The latter proposition of Vattimo is not only the reference that he thinks the *weak thought* as ontological hermeneutics but to the certain concept of *historicity* «because firstly Heidegger considers philosophizing and practices it as his own time conceived by thought, as a reflected expression of themes which before belonging to everyday consciousness are the history of Being, the epoch constituting

moments».⁷ So there is no doubt that the concept of historicity that imposes on Vattimo derives from Heidegger. This concept of historicity is demonstrated comprehensively by Heidegger in regard to Nietzsche's philosophy. To recall Heidegger's thoughts we could notice that he supposed Nietzsche's philosophical thought to be that kind of «knowledge», which «is staying inside the moment opened to our times by the history of Being»⁸. The philosophy of Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, essentially is an answer to the question «What is being in its Being?». And since the setting of truth about the world of beings is the essence of metaphysics, he considers Nietzsche's philosophy *still* as a moment of the history of metaphysics, and not a step for overcoming the metaphysics. Vattimo accepts this Heidegger's position with respect to Nietzsche.

But what kind of relationship does Vattimo keep with Heidegger himself? Defining his position as the *weak thought* Vattimo singles out the two ways of «reading» Heidegger. The *weak thought* is the one that in Heidegger's reconstruction of «metaphysics as the history of Being», i. e. the totality of *Ge-schik*, openness, is not able to see only maintenance of the metaphysical difference between Being and being. The thought that takes into its account that the real Being (God) can not be identified with any being, but is settled beyond every being, every name, every metaphor, according to Vattimo, could only be the «negative theology». That is why it legitimates the infinity of names, metaphors of Being, since the efforts to grasp the real Being (God) are always unsuccessful. The right of Heidegger is how Vattimo calls the interpretation of Heidegger, which thinks the ontological difference in terms of negative theology.

If we think that the end of metaphysics opens the way to metaphor and different names of God it means that we read Heidegger as a negative theologian or even as a metaphysician.

The latter position in regard of Heidegger doesn't take into serious consideration the real significance of Heidegger's concept of historicity.

The left of Heidegger, according to Vattimo, is represented by the *weak thought*. This thought both takes into account the ontological difference and fulfils the demand to think «metaphysics as the history of Being». For Vattimo this means to think the ontological difference as the «happening» of weakening, reduction, «continuous farewell», in which «Being consolidates and becomes valuable as far as it liberates itself and withdraws»⁹.

From the point of view of the *weak thought*, or the left of Heidegger, becomes clear one of the greatest risks of hermeneutical philosophy that influenced Heidegger's heritage: this philosophy legitimates the non-reducible multitude of the images of the world. But cultural relativity, as Vattimo says, is nothing other but the last and more insidious form of the objective metaphysics. It considers all *re-descriptions* (myths, metaphors) to be legitimate ways to represent the world.

From the point of view of the left of Heidegger, the «liberation of metaphor» occurs as the outcome of the process of the conclusion/ accomplishment of metaphysics. This process in no way opens the real structures of Being but appears as having significance, showing direction, «giving the guiding thread which leads from the confusion». Heidegger gives

the name of a «thread» to the diminution of Being, to its liberation and withdrawal. This «thread», according to Vattimo, is the way Being gives itself as a «trace» or «memory»¹⁰.

Thus, the *weak thought* is the disposition of thought that knows its limits. It is an idea of thought which rejects the pretensions of global metaphysical visions. If Heidegger's critique of objective metaphysics makes us reject the pretension to create the adequate concept of Being, it becomes necessary to think Being as in no sense possible to identify with a presence which can be attributed to an object.

Vattimo, after many times having called himself as a «debolist», consistently seeks also to read «debolistically» Nietzsche's, Heidegger's and Christian heritage. It means that he finds «the guiding thread» in the weakening of firm structures. Vattimo considers the moment of Western metaphysics which we live as the overcoming of metaphysics which hasn't been yet concluded.

The history which has a name of Nihilism

On the other hand, the fact that Vattimo finds the end of thread of the history of Being in the weakening of the firm structures of Being means for him that Being has a nihilistic vocation. It means that to reduce, to withdraw, to liberate itself, to weaken is the feature of Being that defines the letting-presence of Being in the epoch of the end of metaphysics. Thus, the history of weakening of Being, according to Vattimo, is the history of nihilism. The problems of nihilism, for Vattimo, is not historiographical, but *geschichtlich* in the sense of the connection made by Heidegger between *Geschichte* (History) and *Geschick* (Destiny)¹¹. Even Heidegger pointed out that nihilism like a move of Western history towards Modernity was firstly recognized by Nietzsche. The same Heidegger, confirming Nietzsche's diagnosis, supposed that Western thought is inevitably to fall in nihilism. Vattimo, while speaking about the nihilistic vocation of Being, doesn't seek to hide that the origin of his attitude on nihilism derives from Nietzsche and Heidegger. He speaks about nihilism in which Nietzsche and Heidegger are able to see not only the outcome (result) of Western history but also its *sense*. Thus, the name of Western history as the history of Being has a name of nihilism. But giving a name to history we still do not indicate which our place in this history is, or, speaking in terms of Heidegger, we still do not define «which moment of hidden Western history do we stand in, or, to put it more generally, whether we stand, or fall or already lie»¹². So here arises the question whether the diagnosis of nihilism is not nihilistic either. «We all are nihilists» – used to say F. Dostojevskij. Does Vattimo, when turning back to Nietzsche and Heidegger, also pronounce that *all*? As it is known, Nietzsche separated the nihilism understood as a revaluation of values from the «classical nihilism», represented by himself. However, Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, is a classical nihilist as far as he, without being aware, takes the position of disillusioned defensiveness against the knowing of the essence of his inside¹³. Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, is not able to think the essence of nihilism until the end. He is made to be classical

nihilist and «to give a word for the history that actually occurs»¹⁴. Therefore, Nietzsche, to Heidegger's mind, «recognizes and grasps nihilism as he himself thinks in a nihilistic way. Nietzsche's concept of nihilism itself is a nihilistic concept»¹⁵. Heidegger, after having placed Nietzsche inside the nihilism, bends to set himself «outside» it. Nihilism, though, for Heidegger doesn't mean the same thing as for Nietzsche. In his *Seinsfrage*, dedicated to Jünger, Heidegger says that the essence of nihilism can't be grasped in simply phenomenological field, i. e. by showing that nothing (or nothingness) remains from the sense of Being. On the contrary, it has to be grasped starting from Nothingness, from the possibility that the totality of being could be the other way or not to be at all. Otherwise, nihilism obscures nothingness. «Arises the question, says Heidegger, whether the intimate essence and power of nihilism do not consist of the fact that people consider Nothingness as something empty, and nihilism as a naked adoration of emptiness, a negation that can easily be defeated by an assertion. Maybe the essence of nihilism is that people do not consider the question about Nothingness as a serious one».¹⁶ To draw the conclusions from Heidegger's opinion on Nietzsche, it becomes clear that, on the one hand, their concepts of nihilism are not equal, on the other hand, that Nietzsche was a nihilist in the other sense as it seemed to himself; and finally, that Heidegger doesn't think to be a nihilist in the sense in which nihilism is attributed to Nietzsche.

Does it have any sense to ask once more about the essence of nihilism? Vattimo, who announced the theme of nihilism as not historiographical but *geschichtlich*, supposes, that it does. Nihilism acts (occurs). Our state can be described using the definition of Nietzsche's «accomplished nihilism». «The accomplished nihilist, says Vattimo, has understood that nihilism is his or her sole opportunity. What is happening to us in regard to nihilism, today, is this: we begin to be, or to be able to be, accomplished nihilists».¹⁷ But what concept of nihilism does Vattimo incline to use when giving a diagnosis of our state, and, according to Heidegger, indicating where we «stand», or whether we «stand» at all, whether we «fall», or even «lie»?

On the one hand, the concept of accomplished nihilism, «the last opportunity», as it is called by Vattimo himself, allows to see the origin of the *weak thought* in L. Pareyson's *ontology of freedom*. Namely through the *ontology of freedom* the *weak thought* adopts the critique of traditional metaphysics which abolished Nothingness. Pareyson considers Nothingness, the shadow of Being, its symmetrical duplicate, to be an indispensable satellite of Being, but not something that is finally abolished, as it is treated by metaphysical thought. The *ontology of freedom* tells the history of Nothingness that contradicts the metaphysical history of *nothingness*. It is the history of *nothingness* which opens itself not as a negativeness that Being calls to be its opposition and at the same time abolishes it, but as a principle which changes Being to Freedom. Being is no more longer supposed to be a rational principle, and it is showed that it can be the other way than a rational principle is. Even more, it is showed that Being can not be at all. However, in the *ontology of freedom*, for Pareyson, the history of *nothingness* doesn't coincide with the history of nihilism. And still it is not without so-called Turin school and his direct teacher that Vattimo accepted the

attitude that the phenomenon of nihilism became hardly possible to explain if we didn't take into account its historical roots, i. e. the *nothingness* which was not only the paradigm of crisis and fall, but firstly the power that in the space of Being opened the possibility of the certain style of life, for the possible self-determination for or against certain values, or even the new manifestation of divinity. Thus, it becomes clear it is not possible to explain the phenomenon of nihilism separating it from the profound connection with the problematic field of the ontology of *nothingness*. Only from the first sight it could seem that nihilism has nothing in common with a fundamental question «Why is Being but not rather *nothingness*?». The way of putting the problem of *nothingness* separates Vattimo from the position which criticizes onto-theology (Derrida, Rorty). *Nothingness* is the central point of the *weak thought*, inspired by the *ontology of freedom*, while the critique of onto-theology evades the theme of *nothingness*, its discourse avoids to discuss it.

Now then the history of nihilism told by Vattimo coincides with the history of *nothingness* or the history of the oblivion of the ontological difference.

In this sense Vattimo has to decide not only for the Nietzsche's «accomplished nihilism», but also for Heidegger's horizon that was consolidated by the *ontology of freedom*: the *nothingness* of Ground (*Grund*), the separation of *Grund* and *Boden* that lets us consider the sense of Being as Freedom.

So what is Vattimo's concept of nihilism? We have to pay attention that Vattimo, who calls himself a nihilist, is able to do this only because, following Heidegger, having read nihilistically Nietzsche, reads also nihilistically Heidegger himself. His attitude in regard to nihilism becomes clear when we recognize the strategy of turning towards each other Nietzsche and Heidegger.

In the first chapter of *The End of Modernity* called *An Apology for Nihilism* Vattimo first of all speaks about these moments of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's nihilism which, to his mind, do coincide. He says that nihilism signifies here what it means for Nietzsche: the situation in which 'man rolls from the centre toward X'. Then he clarifies: nihilism in this sense is the same as it meant for Heidegger, namely the process in which, in the end, 'there is nothing left'. To Vattimo's mind, both positions coincide as they do not speak about man at the psychological or sociological level, but concern Being itself. The latter situation which for Nietzsche means that man without ambiguity recognizes the absence of foundation as the constitution of human situation. But not coincidence of Being and foundation is one of the least ambiguous moments of Heidegger's ontology as well.

Nietzsche and Heidegger, according to Vattimo, come to accord when speaking about contents and ways of manifestation. In this case the process of nihilism for Nietzsche coincides with the «death of God» and the «revaluation of the highest values». For Heidegger in nihilism is demolished as it is completely transformed into values. As it was mentioned above, Heidegger involves also «accomplished nihilist» Nietzsche in the process of nihilism as the transformation of Being into values. Vattimo admits that it is possible to carry into effect this Heidegger's posing Nietzsche against

nihilism. But right here he makes another unexpected step: he poses Nietzsche's nihilism against Heidegger. «Heidegger himself – from a more Nietzschean than Heideggerian point of view – is also a part of the history of the accomplished nihilism, for nihilism seems to be precisely that mode of thought beyond metaphysics for which he is looking».¹⁸ Undoubtedly, this statement expresses rather the position of *weak thought* than «Nietzsche's point of view» on... Heidegger. And indeed, the configuration of the problem of nihilism in Vattimo's philosophy lets us assert without ambiguity that for Vattimo it is much more important to carry out this «Nietzsche's point of view on Heidegger» than *vice versa*, i. e. to read him as an accomplished nihilist, as it is only then when nihilism perceived by Heidegger starts to be «active». On the other hand, only the execution of the both procedures of putting against each other enables us to consider nihilism as the process of the overcoming of metaphysics which is not yet concluded. And it is how the *weak thought* represented by Vattimo treats nihilism.

Thus, the concept of Vattimo's nihilism is from the most part based on the background of Heideggerian nihilism. Because it is only through the hermeneutical development of Heidegger's thought nihilism appears as the sole opportunity of contemporary thought. But shall Vattimo succeed in demonstrating the firmness of «Nietzsche's point of view on Heidegger» as a nihilist?

In the seventh chapter of the third part of *The End of Modernity* named *Hermeneutics and Nihilism* Vattimo asserts that there is a possibility to qualify Heideggerian connection (identity) between Being and language (i. e. what hermeneutical ontology is based on) in a nihilistic way. This kind of assertion, according to Vattimo, if proved could have a fundamental importance for the development of the theory of hermeneutics. Vattimo singles out the two elements of Heideggerian hermeneutics that indicate the relationship between Being and language and allow to interpret this relationship in a nihilistic way: 1) The analysis of Dasein as a hermeneutical totality 2) An attempt to define thought beyond metaphysics in terms of *An-denken* (re-collection, keeping in mind).

Thus, firstly Vattimo announces the vision of Heidegger's hermeneutical constitution of Dasein as nihilistic. Dasein as a hermeneutical totality, i. e. the one that may not be identified with some Kantian *a priori* structure, is well-founded only since connected with mortality: Vattimo says: «Dasein establishes itself as a hermeneutical totality only insofar as it continually lives the possibility of no-longer-being-there. This condition may be described by saying that the foundation of Dasein coincides with groundlessness: the hermeneutical totality of Dasein exists only in relation to the constitutive possibility of no longer being there».¹⁹ Vattimo also indicates that the relation between grounding (funding) and un-grounding of *Sein und Zeit* in his final works corresponds to the concept of the event as *Ereignis*. The latter means the being of the thing, given as something, for self-demolition, for appropriating itself, as it is taken up in «the mirror-play of the world»; and it has the fashion of the 'round dance' but not the fashion of the dialectical founding of totality. Do Dasein, *Sein-zum-Tode* and *Ereignis* demonstrate well-enough Heidegger's nihilism? «In what sense can this

vision of the hermeneutic constitution of Dasein be called 'nihilistic'?» – this is Vattimo's question. And not only the possibility to read Heidegger consistently, but also the solidity of Vattimo's nihilistic position depend on the response to this question. According to Vattimo, the nihilism which is attributed to Heidegger may be described by Nietzsche as the situation in which 'man rolls from the centre towards X'. As it is known, for Nietzsche this situation means that the human subject recognizes that the lack of foundation is a constitutive part of its condition.²⁰ Therefore, after having turned Nietzsche's nihilism against Heidegger, Vattimo finds the equivalents of the latter nihilism also in Heidegger's texts, though Heidegger himself didn't qualify them nihilistically. Vattimo refers to *Sein und Zeit* where Heidegger speaks of the necessity of «forgetting about Being as foundation» if we do wish to become closer to the thought which is not directed to objectiveness.²¹ After having turned Nietzsche against Heidegger, after having recognized the identity of their positions and, at the same time, having applied the Nietzschean nihilism to Heidegger, the nihilistic elements both in the demonstration of hermeneutic totality and in the concept of *Ereignis* become undoubted.

However, here we face another doubt which is obvious, or – to be more exact – which is being naked by Vattimo for demonstrating the doubtfulness of the doubt. «Nevertheless, it would appear that Heidegger's mode of thought is the opposite of nihilism, at least in the sense in which nihilism signifies that process which not only eliminates Being as foundation but forgets about Being altogether».²² In other words, it seems that nihilism for Heidegger is something different than for Nietzsche, as the latter says that nihilism is the process in which at the end «there is nothing left from Being as such». Will it be successful the demonstration of the doubtfulness of the doubt, that is, shall we succeed in proving the possibility to call Heidegger's hermeneutics as nihilistic also in this sense, contradicting Heidegger's texts? Or will it be so successful also the second attempt to turn Nietzsche against Heidegger? For the realisation of this task one needs to demonstrate that the overcoming of the oblivion of Being does not contradict Nietzsche's «there is nothing left from Being as such» and this would mean that the overcoming of the oblivion of Being could only be nihilistic. Namely Heideggerian *An-denken* seems to give the latter possibility. The second of above indicated moments in Heidegger's philosophy, to Vattimo's mind, should reveal itself as an evidence that «this second meaning of nihilism can also be applied to Heidegger's philosophy»²³. *An-denken* is presented as the form of thought that opposes to metaphysical thought which is dominated by the oblivion of Being. In his late works Heidegger himself sought to carry out *Andenken*, the form of recollecting thought, reviving in his memory the greatest moments of the history of metaphysics, i. e. re-thinking the creations of the greatest thinkers and poets. Establishing the relation between these two perspectives of nihilism, Vattimo writes: «The fact of mortality, which founds the hermeneutic totality of existence, appears more clearly in Heidegger's late works as *Andenken* or re-collective thought. It is by retracing the history of metaphysics as the forgetting of Being that Dasein decides for its own death and in this way founds itself as

a hermeneutic totality whose foundation consists of a lack of foundation»²⁴. Vattimo asserts that this *An-denken* is nothing else but leap into abyss «in which we, as mortals, always already find ourselves»²⁵. This is the way how *An-denken* as the entrusting to the liberating bond with tradition become an opposition of metaphysical thought.

However, one may draw a conclusion that Vattimo considers as the most essential the aspect of *An-denken* which refers to the impossibility to carry out the re-collection of Being in other way than non-representative thought. Vattimo says: «Being can never really be thought of as a presence, and the thought that does not forget it is only that which remembers it or, in other words, already thinks of Being as absent, vanished, or gone away»²⁶. This opportunity of Heideggerian thought revealed by Vattimo to re-collect Being as non present unifies the overcoming of the oblivion of Being with nihilism, when «there is nothing left from Being as such». The outcome of this second turning Nietzsche against Heidegger is not only the demonstration of the nihilism of the latter but also the *weak thought* itself as a contemporary opportunity of thought. It is easy to notice that the *weak thought* is valid not only because of reading Nietzsche in a Heideggerian way, but also because of reading Heidegger in a Nietzschean way. Accomplished nihilism understood as a sole opportunity is «debolism», the weakness of Being, the letting-presence of Being not as an object accessible for a representative thought but as recollection or as a *trace*.

Finally, it should be necessary, using another two provocative Vattimo's quotations, to open the perspective which enables *this kind* of reading Nietzsche and Heidegger:

«We recognize that the history of Being has a reductive, 'nihilistic' sense, that it has a tendency to assert the truth of Being through the reduction of the significance of beings (be it a political power, or threatening and angry God of natural religions, or the self-consideration of a modern subject to be the last guarantee of the truth) – all this we recognize only if we are grown up in the Christian tradition».²⁷

«The overcoming of metaphysics may not occur in any other way than a nihilistic one. The sense of nihilism [...] may not be other than a non-defined process of reduction, decrease, weakening. Is it possible to imagine this kind of thought beyond the horizon of Incarnation? May be this is the crucial question to which contemporary hermeneutics should search for an answer (if only it really seeks to go the way that was opened by the invitation of Heidegger to recollect Being (and this is what *Ereignis* really is)».²⁸

Notes

- ¹ Vattimo G. *The End of Modernity. Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. P. 1.
- ² *Ibid.* P. 2.
- ³ *Ibid.* P. 2.
- ⁴ Vattimo G. *Credere di credere*. Garzanti, Milano, 1996. P. 24.
- ⁵ *The End of Modernity*. P. 3.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*

- ⁷ Vattimo G. *La traccia della traccia* // La religion, Editions du Seuil, 1996.
- ⁸ Heidegger M. *Evropeiskij nihilizm* // Vremia i bytie, Moskva, 1993. P. 69.
- ⁹ Vattimo G. *Fine del secolo, fine della secolarizzazione?* // Trascendenza. Trascendentale. Esperienza. Biblioteca dell'«Archivio di filosofia», 12. CEDAM. P. 148.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ *The End of Modernity*. P. 19.
- ¹² Heidegger M. *Evropeiskij nihilizm*. P. 68.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.* P. 74.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 75.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 74.
- ¹⁷ *The End of Modernity*. P. 19.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.* P. 20.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.* P. 116.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 117-118.
- ²¹ *Ibid.* P. 29.
- ²² *Ibid.* P. 118.
- ²³ *Ibid.*
- ²⁴ *Ibid.* P. 119.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ *Ibid.* P. 120.
- ²⁷ *Credere di credere*. P. 37.
- ²⁸ *La traccia della traccia*. P. 105.