

# CONSTITUTING SPATIALIZING FORMALIZING<sup>1</sup>

Dimitri Ginev<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

This paper explores a trajectory of the problematic of spatiality in Heidegger's path of thinking. At stake is the validity of the recapitulation made by him in 1962 lecture *Time and Being* that the thesis of the derivability of spatiality from temporality is untenable. The recapitulation is probed through a comparison between the concept of spaces of dwelling-building in which the fourfold is installed and the phenomenological concept of spatiality as a «secondary existentielle». A special attention is paid to Heidegger's program of disclosing the roots of the mathematical construction of space. The rehabilitation of existential spatiality as Dasein's characteristic that is equiprimordial with temporality requires to developing a theory of the schemes of ek-static spatiality.

**Keywords:** temporilized spatiality, spatializing, secondary existentielle, directionality, de-severance, making room, relatively closed environment, experienced distance, anthropological spaces, bodily spatiality.

One of Heidegger's most extended elaborations on the issue of space-locale-site is to be found in the essay *Building Dwelling Thinking*. In accordance with the interpretation of the ontological difference after the *Kehre*, dwelling is analyzed as the basic characteristic of Being, which is no longer revealed by mortals' existence. Nonetheless, the analysis tells us that in keeping with Being mortals exist as dwellers. Assigning this ontological status to dwelling makes it worthy of thought. At the same time, thinking proves to be inescapable for dwelling. Against the background of this inescapability, Heidegger addresses (though explicitly not until the end of the essay) in his analysis first and foremost the question of how thinking is intrinsic to dwelling, whereby it becomes clear that the analysis's ultimate goal is to circumscribe «man's homelessness» as consisting in the inability to think of the proper plight of dwelling «in our precarious age» as *the plight*.

<sup>1</sup> This article is an enlarged version of a conference paper that was presented by the author within the Sixth Central and Eastern European Conference on Phenomenology «In statu nascendi: Phenomenology, Pedagogy, Psychotherapy», 28 October – 1 November 2009, Vilnius (Lithuania).

<sup>2</sup> Dimitri Ginev – Doctor of Exegetical Sciences, Independent Scholar and a Non-Regular Professor for History of Early Modern Hermeneutics at the University of Sofia, Department of Philosophy Theory of Culture (Sofia, Bulgaria).

Dwelling to which (not only thinking but also) building intrinsically belongs is what constitutes spaces laden by meanings that unfold the manner in which mortals are on the earth, under the sky, and before the divinities. These are spaces that presumably bear the traces of the primal oneness of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. Dwelling brings into play the kinds of spatial reminiscent of the primal oneness. Spaces of dwelling are constituted by initiating mortals, by receiving the sky, by saving the earth, and by awaiting the divinities. The fourfold appears as a four-dimensionality of such spaces. Notoriously, Heidegger states that the thing of a special kind (e. g. a bridge) may gather the fourfold in such a way that allows a site for it. There is no metrics of a dwelling-space since its «four-dimensionality» is «gathered» by means of a thing that is itself a locale. On Heidegger's counter-geometrical dictum, the thing-as-a-locale that gathers the fourfold *makes space* for a site. The inquiry into the way in which the thing is making space for a site opens the discussion of the issue of space-locale-site in the essay under examination. The «essential being» of the dwelling-spaces is received from things-as-locales and not from characteristics of «space». By the same token, the «topology of the fourfold» (the analysis of the sites for the fourfold) has nothing to do with the properties studied by means of topological spaces. Dwelling-spaces are by no means «in space». A dwelling-space has an open boundary for whose illumination Heidegger appeals again to a central phenomenological notion – that of horizon. In quasi-paradoxical formulation, sites are gathering within a horizontal openness that sets a boundary for dwelling.

At this point Heidegger's line of reasoning undergoes a strange turn. He begins to pay more attention to what was carefully removed from the field of inquiry in the first part of the essay – the possibility of measuring things in space as *spatium* and *extensio*. The first step in this turn is to treat (not the thing/locale which makes space for a site of the fourfold as a place, but its) surrounding items as places: the space allowed by the thing-as-a-locale – so Heidegger's argument goes – contains many places variously near or far from the thing. The next step is to introduce a stronger abstraction by treating the places as mere positions between which there lies a measurable distance. Thus, the door to formalizing the concept of space as a variety of positions becomes open. In this formalization the nearness and remoteness between people and things are reduced to mere distances, «mere intervals of intervening space». Height, breadth, and depth are transformed into such intervals. The outcome is a pure *spatium* as a container of things. Yet the formalization can go further.

Once the measurable distance gets established as the only identifiable relation between positions, there is no obstacle to work out the concept of the manifold of the three dimensions. The room created by this manifold is no longer determined by distances. Heidegger argues that this room is no longer a *spatium* and no more than *extensio* that can be further formalized by placing emphasis on analytic-algebraic relations. What he has in mind is not so much analytic geometry (repre-

senting geometrical shapes in a numerical way), but the construction of manifolds with an arbitrary number of dimensions. Thus idealized, «the space» contains no spaces and no places. The rupture with the dwelling-spaces and the «topology of the fourfold» is complete. On this construal, *spatium* and *extensio* are intermediate stages in transforming spatiality from a readiness-to-hand (in dwelling-building) into a pure presence-at-hand as an idealized entity that my means of mathematical construction may generate other idealized entities (some of them with a possible empirical interpretation). *Spatium* and *extensio* make room for things whose existence is only determined by computing the magnitudes of distances, spans, and directions.

In making a detour in the field of space's formalization (and approaching the problematic of a pragmatic-constructive philosophy of geometry), Heidegger manages to delineate a context of discussing «the relation of man and space». The starting-point is the claim that spaces of dwelling and building cannot be interpreted as something that a person faces. These are spaces that are at once constituted and opened up by the finitude of mortals. Only finite beings that are able to stay before the divinities on the earth and under the sky are in need to dwell. In dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of thrownness among things-as-locals. Being thrown and going through spaces is a destiny that human beings cannot avoid. To put it in a terminology closer to *Being and Time*, because of their ek-sistence in spaces of dwelling human beings are never here only as present encapsulated bodies. Human beings can never leave these spaces since the mortals cannot leave behind their belonging to the fourfold. They are doomed to stay with things-as-locals. This is why Heidegger<sup>3</sup> reaches the conclusion that woman's relation to locals, and through locals to spaces, inheres in her dwelling.

My short comment on *Building Dwelling Thinking* cannot omit the concept of the «double space-making» which is allotted to explain why building through constructing locals is a founding and joining of spaces. On the one hand, the things-as-locals admit the fourfold. They are structured in a manner that admits the fourfold as a fore-structure of their structuring. On the other hand, the things-as-locals install the fourfold. As space-making these things are a house of the fourfold. The unity of admitting and installing the fourfold in the process of the double space-making is building. Building is a constant response to the summons of the fourfold. In forging the concept of the double space-making, Heidegger puts forward another strangely sounding claim: Though building never shapes pure «space», it is closer to the origin of «space» (the ontic presupposition for having *spatium* and *extensio*) than any geometry and mathematics. The argument to this claim is that there is no mathematical space that does not stem from forms of dwelling-building, and accordingly, that does not hide sites for the fourfold.

Let me now compare the claim with the elaborations in *Being and Time*. To begin with, in Section 24 of this opus, Heidegger announces

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger M. *Building Dwelling Thinking // Basic Writings*. Ed. by D.F. Krell. London: Routledge, 1978. P. 359.

a program for treating the stages of conceptualizing spatial relations within the scope of existential analytic. It is the program of investigating the «existential genesis» of the main geometrical concepts of space. Heidegger states:

«When space is intuited formally, the pure possibilities of spatial relations are discovered. Here one may go through a series of stages in laying bare pure homogeneous space, passing from the pure morphology of spatial shapes to *analysis situs* and finally to the purely metrical science of space»<sup>4</sup>.

Immediately after outlining the sketch of this investigation, Heidegger declares that it will not be undertaken in the present book. Yet the study of the existential genesis of mathematical space is by no means a «side-program» within the scope of fundamental ontology. Searching for this genesis is *sine qua non* for overcoming that hypostatization of mathematical space which characterizes the ontological approach to the world as *res extensa*. Thus considered, it is a prerequisite for destructing the «ontology of presence» (*Vorhandenheitsontologie*). Not by accident in *Being and Time* the announced sketch of the program supervenes on the hermeneutic critique of the Cartesian conception of the world.

To be sure, there is an important «mathematical aspect» in Heidegger's sketch. Obviously, what he has in mind in stressing the «series of stages» is a kind of Felix Klein's hierarchy of geometrical spaces. Heidegger believes that by addressing the problematic of spatiality of circumspective manipulation within-the-world from the viewpoint of the role played by existential analytic as a kind of (phenomenological) constitutional analysis of meaning, one would give an account of changes in the pre-scientific articulation of spatial contexts of routine practices leading to the need of conceptualizing and formalizing space. Though guided by different interpretations of the ontological difference the scenarios of the «space» origin are converging in several respects. In *Being and Time* scenario there is a continuity between the existential spatiality and all mathematical spaces (regardless their degree of idealization and formalization). By the same token the scenario of *Building Dwelling Thinking* states that there is no kind of «space» that is not genealogically related to spaces whose locales make room for the four-fold. There is also a significant kinship between existential spatiality and dwelling-spaces. In saying this, now I would like to pay more attention to the way Heidegger approaches the derivability of space's formalized concepts from the spatiality of being-in-the-world and the spatiality of making room.

Tentatively speaking, in *Being and Time* spatiality is a «secondary» existentials grounded upon the primary attributes of Dasein's care – interpretative understanding, discourse, state-of-mind, and fall. As a constant process of making room within-the-world, spatiality is always temporalized, i.e. there is no spatiality beyond the horizon of tempo-

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger M. *Being and Time* / Trans. from German by J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson. San Francisco: Harper, 1962. P. 147.

rality. Thus, spatiality is always interpretatively understood, expressed within a configuration of discursive practices and by means of a certain discursive genre, thrown in the average everydayness, and temporalized. At the same time, one might speak of the «spatiality of understanding», «attuned spatiality», «spatiality of discourse», and «spatiality of falling», all of them being distinguished by concomitant kinds of temporalizing of temporality. What gets temporalized is the ways of making room for a meaningful articulation of the world. A case in point here is the way of making room for anticipation that indicates Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being, or the way in which the «authentic future» is winning itself from the «inauthentic future». In addressing this issue, Heidegger makes the case that the way of making room for anticipation (as opposed to awaiting of inauthentic future) constitutes the spatiality of resolute existence. To be sure, however, the problematic of this spatiality has little to do with the issues of the afore-mentioned program for treating the stages of mathematical conceptualization of spatial relations. What is significant for the latter is that the spatiality of being-in-the-world privileges various directions of circumspensive manipulation. The pre-scientific images of space reflect these privileged directions. By implication, the «oriented space» of routine everydayness is essentially anisotropic. The most important step on the way to geometrical concepts of space is the change of anisotropic images in isotropic constructions.

The «series of stages in laying bare pure homogeneous space» Heidegger refers to is to be continued by another series distinguished by moves from one to another formally codified spaces, i. e. from one to another group of transformations, each of which determining a class of possible spatial objects one can construct in the framework of a certain geometry. Accordingly, such a group defines criteria of existence of spatial objects as characterized by invariant (with respect to the algebraic transformations) properties. Thus, only some very general properties (such as sidedness, insiderness, outsiderness, and all «connectivity properties») can be identified as invariant under the most extended group of topological transformations. If one is in need of a stronger idealization (formalization) of the concept of space, one has to restrict the topological transformations (as defining the morphology of spatial shapes), specifying thereby the group of projective transformations. The latter do not preserve sizes or angles. Yet the relations of incidence and cross-ratio remain invariant under this group. In a next move one arrives at the transformations of affine geometry which in contrast to projective transformations preserve the property of parallelism. Under this new group the properties of the homographic spatial objects are invariant. (Roughly speaking, Klein's celebrated program is an attempt to characterize geometries on the basis of projective transformations and group theory. On the basic assumption of this program, the more one is progressively restricting the range of transformations, the greater is the enrichment with regard to specific spatial objects. In other words the less of the properties remain invariant under the respective group, the greater is the number of particular geometrical objects.)

Heidegger believes that the most extended group of algebraic transformations of geometrical relations has a genesis from contexts of spatializing within the circumspective manipulation of the everyday being-in-the-world, while the more restricted groups (including those of Euclidean geometry and metrical geometry that conserves the property of distance) are arising out through enhancing already existing geometrical idealizations. According to him, the homogeneous (topological) spaces as expressed by continuous transformations which bring new points into a one-one correspondence with the old points are closest to the pre-scientific image of space (as generated immediately by the «existential spatiality» within-the-world). The topological transformations not only preserve spatial properties of objects which are under continuous deformations, but they also keep intact to a certain extent the idea of «place» or «locality» (as basic moment of the spatiality of circumspective manipulation). It is another question that localities in the spatiality of circumspective comportment within-the-world are related to an anisotropic heterogeneity of spatial relations that is incompatible with space's homogeneity implied by the topological transformations.

The intended program of searching for an existential genesis of geometrical space is to be placed in the context of Heidegger's existential interpretation of science. Yet the program (as sketched out in Section 24) differs essentially from the existential conception of science (as developed in Section 69). The program admits that the metric space stems out of the spatiality of circumspective manipulation, or the spatiality that belongs to the ecstatic unity of Dasein with what is ready-to-hand within-the-world. Metric space is a cognitive structure that becomes possible when the ecstatic unity is replaced by an epistemic distance between knowing subject and objective reality. A particular aspect of the way this structure gets established consists in transforming the «locations» of things that are ready-to-hand in everyday practices into «world-points» which are released from specific «environmental confinements». The existential environment becomes a homogeneous space. It can be detached from Dasein's concerned circumspection, and analyzed with regard to its own properties that are independent of the ecstatic existence within-the-world. The independence itself is «guaranteed» by the group of transformation that preserves the invariance of space's basic properties. Put differently, the projection of an abstract mathematical structure allows one to disentangle space from the spatiality of Dasein's everyday being-in-the-world. Yet before this projection takes place, there is a «tendency» in everyday mode of being-in-the-world towards objectifying whole regions of entities present-at-hand. (An outcome of this tendency is the plurality of pre-scientific images of space stressing various asymmetries and anisotropic features.) The projection of mathematical structure (group of transformations) is not to be isolated from an interrelatedness of practices that articulate context and environments. The projection of a structure that objectifies the homogeneous space has always its existential genesis within the contextualized dealings with what is ready-to-hand.



In scrutinizing the origin of the theoretical attitude out of circumspection, Heidegger observes that by committing to such an attitude one overlooks not only the tool-character of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world, but also something that is inherent in ready-to-hand equipment – its place. The contextual location of a tool becomes a matter of indifference whereby a manifold of spatio-temporal positions begins to take shape. The theoretical attitude requires a formal closure of the manifold with regard to some invariant structure. The «mathematical projection» of such a structure – so Heidegger’s argument goes – transforms the manifold of spatio-temporal positions into a formally codified space. What is decisive in the mathematical projection is that this projection discloses something that is a priori for theoretical idealizations about empirical phenomena. In other words, the mathematical codification of space discloses at the same time a possible domain of empirical theorizing. To reiterate, Heidegger never attempted to carry out the program of the existential genesis of geometrical spaces out of the spatiality of circumspective manipulation within-the-world. Why?

I mentioned that there is an essential difference between the genesis of mathematical space as addressed in the existential conception of science and the program of the transition from existential spatiality to geometrical spaces. In contrast to the continuity between existential spatiality and the stages of formalizing the concept of isotropic space, the existential conception of science concedes that there is an ineluctable discontinuity. The mathematical space is an outcome of the «mathematical projection of the world». The former depends entirely on the structure of the latter. Hence, the analytics of existential spatiality has nothing to do with the formation of science’s concepts of space. Just as the science’s existential genesis the formation of these concepts requires an analysis carried out exclusively in terms of the theory of ecstatic temporality. If this genesis is to be addressed also in terms of the theory of ek-static spatiality, then spatiality must be regarded as a primary existentielle. This is what the author of *Being and Time* cannot accept. In other words, the existential conception of science provides an additional argument for the claim that spatiality is not only a secondary existentielle, but it is (in principle) derivable from temporality. The program of the existential genesis of geometrical spaces out of the spatiality of circumspective manipulation within-the-world remains unfulfilled for it is in conflict with that claim.

In the remainder I will pick up the thread of Arisaka<sup>5</sup> and Casey<sup>6</sup> who, based upon Heidegger’s confession (in 1962 lecture *Time and Being*) that the attempt to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable, are trying to defend the status of spatiality as primary existentielle. Arisaka<sup>7</sup> argues, in particular, that the relationship between

<sup>5</sup> Arisaka Y. Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in Being and Time // *Philosophy Today*. 1996. № 40/1. P. 36–46.

<sup>6</sup> Casey E. *The Fate of Place*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1997. P. 243–284.

<sup>7</sup> Arisaka, op. cit., p. 37.

temporality and spatiality has to be spelled out as an equiprimordial and not as a foundational one. The equiprimordiality of both existentials implies interdependence between temporality and spatiality. Casey<sup>8</sup> goes further in asserting that

«the dogmatic restriction of *Platz* and *Gegend* to the instrumental world and of *Raum* to the scientific world closes down on their scope within the existential analytic of *Dasein*».

What does it mean to consider ek-static spatiality as a primary existential? Trying to answer this question I will concentrate my attention on the types of spatiality Heidegger differentiates in the existential analytics.

*Dasein*'s temporalized spatiality is not to be detached from the way of conceiving the world as a horizon that temporalizes itself in temporality. In advocating this claim, Heidegger distinguishes between the «spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world» and the «spatiality of being-in-the-world». The former is the closeness of utensils and equipment that *Dasein* implements in the circumspective manipulation within-the-world. This spatiality is a function of the closeness' self-regulation in the ongoing articulation of contexts of equipment (*Zeugzusammenhänge*). Closeness expresses the contextual being of a utensil or equipment. (The rationale for speaking that closeness regulates itself is provided by the very nature of the worldhood of the world. Changing connections among contexts of equipment correspond to the changing configurations of practices within the world. It is the changeability of both, configurations and contexts that provokes variability of the spatial locations of tools and equipment employed in circumspective manipulation.)

Heidegger attributes the «production of closeness» to the trans-subjective totality of interrelated practices and contexts of equipment. This production is irreducible to a purely subjective behavior. Furthermore, closeness is a function of the contextual involvements of a tool or equipment that is ready-to-hand in circumspective manipulation. Obviously, closeness cannot be measured objectively, since it is the circumspective manipulation within a context of equipment that ascertains whether the utensil is enough «to hand». What gets ascertained is the place of the utensil within this context. Because spatiality is a complexity of contexts and environments that does not display characteristics of a dimensional space, the contextual place of a tool is not reducible to a position in a mathematical manifold of positions. By the same token, closeness or remoteness of a tool in a particular environment cannot be equated with a distance which is a purely geometrical notion applicable solely to metric spaces. Heidegger insists on the fact that closeness and remoteness are not measurable variables. They are entirely dependent on the contextuality of circumspective manipulation. (Remoteness and closeness are qualitative features of *Dasein*'s circumspective thrownness in everyday

---

<sup>8</sup> Casey, op. cit., p. 254.



practices. Relativity effects of spatiality belong to this thrownness. In this regard, Heidegger<sup>9</sup> provides the following illustration:

«When a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantly that they are 'sitting on his nose', they are environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall. Such equipment has so little closeness that often it is proximally quite impossible to find. Equipment for seeing – and likewise for hearing, such as the telephone receiver – has what we have designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand».

Generally speaking, the relativity effects are due to the discordance between contextualizing a utensil for reaching a purpose and grasping the outcome of that contextualization as an actualized possibility.) Heidegger defines a context of equipment as a multiplicity of places which are not statically present-at-hand, but depend on the definite «here» and «yonder» that accompany the dealings taking place in the context. This is why the places that are circumspectively interpreted within a context of equipment are not to be catalogued by procedures that objectify space as a mathematical structure.

Roughly speaking, in introducing the «spatiality of being-in-the-world», Heidegger is willing to demonstrate that there is a higher degree of spatiality's «ontological autonomy» from the readiness-to-hand. This type of spatiality characterizes the situatedness of the «circumspection of concern» in a world that is always already transcendent rather than what is going on within-the-world circumspectively. Dasein is dealing with readiness-to-hand – so Heidegger's argument goes – with familiarity just because this spatial dealing takes place «in» the world that transcends (as an open horizon) all particular contexts of equipment. It is the «transcendence of the world» that launches the spatiality of being-in-the-world. (The example Heidegger provides with regard to the above-mentioned «ontological autonomy» is the left-right-directionality. Left and right are not something entirely dependent on Dasein's concerned circumpection. They are directions of the directedness into a world that because of its horizontality is always already transcendent. Thus considered, left and right are directions of the spatiality that belong to the «transcendence of the world».)

The difference between both types of spatiality reflects to a certain extent the ontico-ontological difference since the spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world can be established by a purely «ontic observation» whereas the spatiality of being-in-the-world requires an ontological reflection upon the transcendence of the world. In this regard, Heidegger goes on to lay the claim that the spatiality of being-in-the-world (as related to the transcendence of the world) provides the ontic possibility of Dasein's environmental encountering of the readiness-to-hand. (This spatiality is generated by the «worldhood of the world». But there is a worldhood because the world is transcendent.) I use the ex-

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p.141.

pression of «existential spatiality» for designating the dynamic unity of both types of spatiality in the process of meaning constitution.

There is also another way in which both types of spatiality (or aspects of existential spatiality) are to be differentiated. Since the spatiality of being-in-the-world gets constituted by means of the way the world is transcending all kinds of subjectivity (including the inter-subjectivity of being-with-one-another), one should ascribe to this spatiality a sort of trans-subjectivity that is irreducible to the inter-subjectivity. By contrast, the spatiality of ready-to-hand within-the-world is only a characteristic of being-with-one-another because it is generated by the inter-subjective articulation of relatively closed environments. (I am using the expression of a «relatively closed environment» as a translation of what Heidegger calls *Gegend*.) Thus, the opposition between trans-subjectivity and inter-subjectivity plays an important role in elucidating the difference between both types of spatiality.

In existential analytics the notion of «making room» is assigned to render possible the dynamic unity of types. Making room (spatializing) within-the-world consists in releasing the ready-to-hand for its possible contexts and relatively closed environments. Making room is constantly accompanying the constitution of meaning as ongoing appropriation of possibilities. Put differently, there is no interpretative articulation without spatializing. Furthermore, one can state that in each context of equipment Dasein is making room for a leeway of possibilities that can be actualized. At the same time these are possibilities projected as a horizon by the same configuration of practices that discloses a particular environment of interwoven contexts of equipment. As an existentielle making room belongs to both the contextual spatiality of manipulating the ready-to-hand and the spatiality that is called into being and established by the transcendence of the world. Only by making room for entities within-the-world one is able to encounter a totality of spatial involvements of these entities that can be made accessible for cognition.

From the viewpoint of the transcendental position advocated in *Being and Time*, space becomes accessible for cognition and is constituted as a possible object because the contextual making room belongs at once to the circumspective manipulation and to the transcendence of the world, i.e. it belongs at once to the ontic availability of what gets spatialized and to the transcendental condition of having such an availability in the world. All «entities» (including space) that are disclosed in the world by Dasein's circumspective being-in-the-world can be made under certain conditions possible objects of knowledge. This is why the possibility of space as an entity that can be thematically objectified is laid bare not within the epistemic subject-object relation: *Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space*. In stressing the pre-epistemological origin of space, Heidegger<sup>10</sup> indicates several lines of developing this claim. On his account, the possibility of objectifying space depends on the changeability of the circumspective deliberation inherent in making

---

<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 146.

room within-the-world in an attitude of de-contextualizing spatial relations (of contextual involvements) whereby the latter become relations of positions in a mathematically expressible manifold.

Let me note again that according to Heidegger, there are concepts of space (both in Dasein's average everydayness and in doing research guided by a theoretical attitude) just because the interpretative appropriation of possibilities within-the-world is constantly making room, uniting thereby the spatiality of circumspective manipulation and the spatiality of being-in-the-world. Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology shows the ubiquity of the existentials of making room. There is no scheme of ecstatic temporality without a specific regime of making room (a regime of spatializing that accompanies a certain kind of temporalizing). This is why in *Being and Time* there is a section devoted to «the temporality of the spatiality». Its task is to outline the integrity of «Dasein's spatio-temporal character». More specifically, Heidegger tries in this section to address (though superficially) the problematic of how the modalities of temporalizing get (necessarily) complemented by modalities of spatializing whereby in each «chrono-topos» one is making room for one's leeway. In extrapolating issues of this problematic one might go on to develop a sort of chrono-topology in terms of existential analytics.

In fact, this is the idea that is already exploited in existential psychiatry. The point here is that each state of temporalizing-spatializing within the world (including the psychopathological states) constitutes a heterogeneity of spatial relations that leads to a peculiar image of an anisotropic space. The constitution of meaning within routine everydayness accentuates always certain directionalities, loading thereby its outcome – the «oriented and directed meaning» – with specific values. The «axiological structure» of the oriented (and attuned) spaces is precisely what gets lost in the transition to homogeneous space.

The existential spatiality upon which the uncovering of space within-the-world is founded is characterized by two «parameters» of de-severance (*Ent-fernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*). More specifically, Dasein's making room for its own leeway of actualized possibilities is constituted by directionality and de-severance. The former is not to be confused with the notion of vector that is only definable in a mathematical space. In its «deliberative circumspection» Dasein manages to eliminate the farness of what is ready-to-hand to it. By contextualizing the utensils in the everyday dealing within-the-world, Dasein creates constantly de-severance. In other words, the delineation of a particular context of equipment brings to the fore a kind of de-severance. This is why Heidegger goes on to assert that Dasein is essentially de-severant, i. e. Dasein is making the farness vanish by putting utensils in readiness. Consequently, in Dasein's primordial mode of being-in-the-world an «essential tendency towards closeness» takes place. The «morphology» of existential spatiality is defined by «circumspective concern» which decides as to the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally.

Directionality is a characteristic of circumspective concern which is de-severing. By means of it in this concern a «supply of signs» for «whithers» to which something belongs or goes, or gets brought or fetched is coming into being. Making room within a configuration of practices through appropriating and actualizing possibilities is temporalized since it is a directional awaiting of a relatively autonomous environment. Thus, temporalized directionality of dealing with the ready-to-hand is a prerequisite for articulating the world in environments. Finally, out of the temporalized directionality of making room the fixed directions of right and left are arising. Like de-severance, directionality of making room is mediating between the spatiality of readiness-to-hand and the spatiality of being-in-the-world. The former contains only contingent and occasional directions of near and remote directions, while the latter is stabilizing and privileging directions like up and down of vertical axis, right and left, before and behind of horizontal plane, and so on. The images of «oriented space» are called into life thanks to privileged directions in the constitution of meaning through actualizing possibilities. These are images that help to identify «great» and «small» as well-defined, qualitatively different sizes.

In conclusion I would like to indicate a task that still has a philosophical actuality. In order to treat spatiality as a primary existentiale that is equiprimordial with temporality one has developed a theory of the «spatializing of spatiality» in analogy with the temporalizing of temporality. Heidegger's term for contextual spatializing within-the-world is «making room». Yet the latter is by no means spatializing of spatiality. The extension of the existentiale of making room as spatializing of spatiality amounts to figuring out the ecstatic schemes of spatiality. Presumably, these should be the schemes of spatiality of understanding, attuned spatiality, spatiality of discourse, and spatiality of falling.

## References

- Arisaka Y. (1996) Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in Being and Time, *Philosophy Today*, 40/1, pp. 36–46.
- Casey E. (1997) *The Fate of Place*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- Heidegger M. (1962) *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson. San Francisco: Harper.
- Heidegger M. (1978) Building Dwelling Thinking. In: D.F. Krell (ed.) *Basic Writings*, London: Routledge, 1978, pp. 343–364.