THE METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY

Abstract

The foundations of deliberative democracy rest on ideals of communicative rationality, as articulated by Jürgen Habermas, a key representative of the Frankfurt School’s second generation. Emerging from critical theory’s broader critique of instrumental rationality, deliberative democracy emphasizes public discourse and consensus as essential mechanisms for legitimate governance. This model assumes that through discourse ethics, diverse societal interests can converge toward norms, transcending partial biases. However, in times of uncertainty — particularly during war or social upheaval — these assumptions face significant challenges. The historical context of the Frankfurt School’s development underscores this point. Established amidst the European crises of the early 20th century, critical theorists like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer grappled with the failures of rationality that led to totalitarianism. The critique of deliberative democracy in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war highlights the need to reassess the theory’s practical and ethical foundations. While deliberative democracy aspires to foster inclusivity and legitimacy through rational discourse, its application during periods of profound uncertainty exposes critical vulnerabilities. These include the challenges of relativism, asymmetrical power dynamics, and the ethical risks of procedural neutrality. The aim of this study is to probe the practical applicability and evaluate the core epistemological and ethical assumptions of deliberative democracy, particularly its Habermasian formulations, when confronted with conditions of uncertainty. It critically examines the theoretical underpinnings of deliberative democracy, its limitations, and the ethical dilemmas posed by its procedural inclusivity. Methodological approach taken in this article builds upon case study to illustrate the limitations of deliberative democracy, and draws on critical theory — especially those of Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas — to evaluate its epistemological and ethical assumptions.