Plurality as a Value in Arendt’s Political Philosophy

Article

Abstract

[In English]

Hannah Arendt is known for her claim that plurality constitutes a central value for political life. It forms the normative core of her whole standpoint. It is not that clear, however, how plurality is to be understood, and in what senses it is valuable. In my contribution I emphasize several levels as central to her standpoint. 1. Plurality as the differences between individuals, including an affirmation of the value of individual freedom. 2. Worldlineness as the field of human multiplicity as in common. It situates us in a condition of equality (nobody is initially more worthy than anyone else) and diversity (of individuals) 3. The political as the encounter of a multiplicity of views. 4. A diagnostic distinction between institutional arrangements that diminishes plurality and a society that enables plurality. Arendt’s analysis brings together general reflections on the human condition and a diagnostic perspective of the present. She works out her normative conception from both of them. When viewed from a contemporary perspective Arendt’s conception can be assessed in two ways. We will have to ask to what extent her diagnosis is applicable in the contemporary world. It seems clear that we need additional conceptual tools to Arendt’s to understand our own predicament. Second, we may ask how valid her normative standpoint is and how it may be developed. In my contribution I reflect on how her defence of plurality is to be distinguished from liberal pluralism, and how the idea of plurality as the encounter of different perspectives can be interpreted in humanist perspective as a defence of cosmopolitan human rights, a strengthening of the political domain and a decentering of power relations on a global level.