Du concept de vécu dans l’Essai de Bergson. Hypothèse autour d’une traduction phénoménologique

Article

Abstract

[In French]

Henri Bergson’s Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience
should mean for phenomenology and its historical development
a source of questions and further possibilities for self-understanding:
one can claim to find in its pages the origin of the
philosophical language which enabled phenomenology to arrive in
France and translate itself – as if Bergsonism, at the very moment
it lends its own words to phenomenology, had also enabled the arrival
of its most radical critic. Such a language is meanly related to
the notion of vécu, which, within Bergson’s first work, lies at the
centre of a weave between several, and to some extent very different
from each other, notions of «duration». In what follows, by
firstly commenting a Gadamer’s remark, we make an attempt to
bring to light this intricate setting (§§ 2.1.–3.3.) and the way Bergsonian
concept of vécu probably represented, in its inner twofold
meaning, a model to conceive and translate the phenomenological
concept of Erlebnis (§§ 1.1.–1.2.).